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Survey of Professional Responsibility
SECURITIES ATTORNEYS FACE LIABILITY FOR WRONGS OF THEIR
CORPORATE CLIENTS
Traditionally, claims against lawyers for the wrongful actions of
their corporate clients were valid only if the attorney was a pri-
mary participant in the offense.' Recently, injured investors have
sought to hold attorneys who serve corporate clients secondarily
liable for the illegal actions of those clients when the attorney ren-
ders legal services,2 with knowledge of those actions.' Modern cor-
See, e.g., United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 863 (2d Cir. 1964) (lawyer consid-
ered active participant and liable in fraud based on procurement of broker for conspira-
tional scheme and preparation of false list of assets and opinion letters), cert. denied, How-
ard v. Benjamin, 377 U.S. 953 (1964); In re Investors Funding Corp. of N.Y. Sec. Litig.,
566 F. Supp. 193, 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (claims allowed against attorney alleging direct
involvement in illegal diversion of funds); United States v. Schwartz, [1970-71 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) § 93, 023 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (lawyer considered active par-
ticipant in unlawful hypothecation because he arranged and financed fraudulent transac-
tion, personally guaranteed repayment and supervised unlawful public offering); Adams v.
American Western Sec., Inc., 265 Or. 514, 510 P.2d 838, 844-45 (1973) (lawyer consid-
ered active participant in sale of security if he prepared, executed, personally delivered and
filed documents of registration with knowledge sale had already been made); Strahan v.
Rodney, 97 Cal. App. 2d 448, 217 P.2d 711, 713 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950) (attorney, who was
also director and secretary of corporation, liable for fraudulent sale of stock because he
voted to make, prepared and signed application for permit of issuance).
Historically, successful actions against lawyers involved with securities transactions went
far beyond mere claims that the attorney failed to fulfill his professional responsibility. See
Lowenfels, Expanding Public Responsibilities of Securities Lawyers: An Analysis of the New Trend
in Standard of Care and Priorities of Duties, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 412, 413-416 (1974). These
traditional actions placed the lawyer at the center of a blatant fraud, and then positioned
him as a primary actor at the "fulcrum of fraudulent activity." Id. at 413. In contrast,
claims against lawyers who did not "scheme to defraud" but who were involved in the
formulation and execution of the transaction as counsel and advisor were not successful. Id.
See, e.g., Nicewarner v. Bleavins, 244 F. Supp. 261, 266 (D. Colo. 1965) (attorney did not
step out of role as professional counsel, and therefore was not liable, although services
were vital to transaction); Hughes v. Bie, 183 So. 2d 281, 283-84. (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966)
(lawyer's preparation and execution of legal documents insufficient to render him liable).
' See DeBenedictis, Lawyer Deep Pockets: Attorneys Face Malpractice Claims for Clients' Dubi-
ous Deals, 76 A.B.A. J. 34, 34 (Jan. 1990). "More and more, people injured in dubious
financial deals are suing the lawyers who represented the deal makers. And more and
more, courts are lettirg them do it . I..." d. Attorneys who worked on deals that went
sour are increasingly expected to serve as scapegoats for disappointed shareholders. See
Jensen, Deals May Backfire for Firms; Beyond Malpractice, Nat'l. L.J., Jan. 16, 1989, at 1.
Plaintiffs allege that day to day activities, such as aiding in the preparation of materials
for a public offering or rendering legal opinions, constitute sufficient participation for lia-
bility. See, e.g., SEC v. Electronics Warehouse, Inc., 689 F. Supp. 53, 60 (D. Conn. 1988),
affd sub. norn., SEC v. Calvo, 891 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3228
(1990) (attorneys may be liable as aiders and abettors of client's fraud if documents drafted
include erroneous information or material omissions); Arden Way Assocs. v. Boesky, 664
F. Supp. 855, 857 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (claims asserted against attorney defendants who ren-
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porate practice facilitates this trend by encouraging and allowing
attorneys to participate in the decision-making processes and to sit
on the board of directors of their corporate clients."
A predominant legal theory utilized in the attempt to hold at-
torneys secondarily liable is "aiding and abetting" client miscon-
duct.' To prove that a defendant attorney aided and abetted a
dered legal opinions and prepared prospectus containing deficiencies); Seidel v. Public
Serv. Co. of New Hampshire, 616 F. Supp. 1342, 1360-62 (D.N.H. 1985) (law firm liable
for preparation and dissemination of misleading materials). See generally Reycraft, Conflicts
of Interest and Effective Representation: The Dilemma of Corporate Counsel, 39 HASTiNGS L.J.
605, 612-613 (1988) (describing recent actions against corporate and securities lawyers).
$ See SEC v. Washington County Util. Dist., 676 F.2d 218, 224 (6th Cir. 1982). Knowl-
edge is a requirement which must be satisfied to find that one aided and abetted another's
wrong. Id. Generally, "a person may be held as an aider and abettor only if some other
party has committed a securities law violation ... and if the accused aider-abettor knowingly
and substantially assisted the violation." Id. (citing SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1316 (6th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975)) (emphasis added)). See also In re Citisource,
Inc. Securities Litigation, 694 F. Supp. 1069, 1082-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (cause of action for
securities violation dismissed because status as special counsel alone will not infer requisite
scienter); Vereins-Und Westbank, A.G. v. Carter, 639 F. Supp. 620, 623 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
(preparation of falsified documents alone will not infer knowledge of fraud without allega-
tion attorneys knew statements to be false); Mendelsohn v. Capital Underwriters, Inc., 490
F. Supp. 1069, 1088 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (preparation of documents does not infer knowledge
or reckless indifference to fraud). But see Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman, Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38,
44 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978) (lawyer without actual knowledge may be
liable if he disregarded wrongful action); SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486, 489 (2d Cir. 1968)
(attorney who has no actual knowledge of fraud may be liable if found he should have
known); Kilmartin v. H.C. Wainwright & Co., 580 F. Supp. 604, 608 (D. Mass. 1984) (court
refused to dismiss claims against attorney holding that knowledge of fraud may be averred
generally).
" See Jensen, supra note 2, at 1. The litigation explosion against attorneys is keeping pace
with the expansion of attorneys' roles. Id. Lawyer liability for deals that go bad "comes
with the territory as business advisor to the deal-makers" and the "investment-banker-type
fees some law firms are charging ...." Id. See, e.g., Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip.
Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 575-76 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (attempt to dispose of case failed since
lawyer had nominal position in management); Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp., 283 F.
Supp. 643, 689-92 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (attempt to dispose of case by averring lack of knowl-
edge failed since lawyer sat on board of directors). See generally Reycraft, supra note 2, at
614-15 (discussing lawyers susceptibility to lawsuits when they actively participate in their
client's business).
' See Comment, Aiding and Abetting Liability Under Securities Exchange Act Section 10(b) and
SEC Rule 10b-5: The Infusion of A Sliding-Scale, Flexible-Factor Analysis, 22 LOY. L.A.L. REV.
1189, 1191 (1989) [hereinafter Comment, Aiding and Abetting Liability]. Aiding and abet-
ting liability has become increasingly important in securities violations situations where a
primary violator is insolvent and a remotely connected potential defendant, such as an at-
torney, has the ability to pay the judgment. Id. See, e.g., Rolf, 570 F.2d at 44 (2d Cir. 1977)
(attorney liable as aider and abettor), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978); Arden Way As-
socs. v. Boesky, 664 F. Supp. 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (action brought against Fried, Frank,
Harris, Shriver & Jacobson for allegedly aiding and abetting fraud of Ivan Boesky). In re
Allied Stores Corp., [current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. § 84, 142 (June 29, 1987) (SEC alleged
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client's fraud, the plaintiff must prove knowledge of a primary vi-
olation and substantial assistance by the corporate attorney.6
Technically, aiding and abetting liability requires counsel to over-
step his or her role as corporate counsel and to aid in the fraud.
Often, the facts and issues concerning specific attorney action are
not tried in court, however, because attorneys negotiate and pay
large settlements fearing irreparable damage to their firm's
reputation.'
attorney/director of Sullivan & Cromwell aided and abetted fraud). See also infra note 6
and accompanying text (discussing aiding and abetting liability).
An alternate legal theory which frequently arises in attorney liability actions is counsel as
a "controlling person" within the corporation. See § 20(a) Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. § 78t(a). The 1934 Act provides:
Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable under any provi-
sion of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall also be liable jointly
and severally with and to the same extent as such controlled person . . . is liable,
unless the controlling person acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly
induce the act or acts constituting the violation or cause of action.
Id.
Case law has further defined "control." See Seidel v. Public Serv. Co. of New Hampshire,
616 F. Supp. 1342, 1361-62 (D.N.H. 1985). In this case, the district court of New Hamp-
shire defined a "controlling person" as one having power to direct the action and policy of
another and therefore participate in some sense in the action. Id. The Seidel court noted
that corporations generally follow attorney advice. Id. at 1362. See also Pharo v. Smith, 621
F.2d 656, 670 (5th Cir. 1980) (approving SEC definition of "control" as "possession ... of
the power to direct or cause the direction of the management and policies of a person");
Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 779 (3d Cir. 1976) (defined as "influ-
ence short of actual direction"); Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1295 (D.N.J. 1989)
(endorsing "control by status" approach); American Gen. Ins. Co. v. Equitable Gen. Corp.,
493 F. Supp. 721, 751 (E.D. Va. 1980) (control includes ability to influence person's deci-
sion-making process).
' See Stokes v. Lokken, 644 F.2d 779, 782-83 (8th Cir. 1981). The three-part test for
determining aiding and abetting liability requires: (1) the existence of a securities law viola-
tion by the primary party (as opposed to the aiding and abetting party); (2) "knowledge" of
the violation on the part of the aider and abettor; and (3) "substantial assistance" by the
aider and abettor in the achievement of the primary violation. Id. (citing lIT, An Int'l Inv.
Trust v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1980)). See also Norman v. Brown, Todd &
Heyburn, 693 F. Supp. 1259, 1264 (D. Mass. 1988) (stating common law definition of aid-
ing and abetting as variation of joint tort liability); First Fed. Sav. and Loan Assoc. of
Pittsburgh v. Oppenheim, Appel, Dixon & Co., 634 F. Supp. 1341, 1351-53 (S.D.N.Y.
1986) (discussing elements required to find aiding and abetting liability); infra notes 34-48
and accompanying text (discussing aiding and abetting liability).
" See Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490, 496 (7th Cir. 1986)
(substantial assistance means "more than just a little aid"). Wright v. Schock, 571 F. Supp.
642, 663 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (substantial assistance is more than mere "ministerial tasks"). See
generally Comment, Aiding and Abetting Liability, supra note 5, at 1203-08 (discussing con-
duct which constitutes aiding and abetting).
' See Tabac, Crossfire at the Bar, New York Times, May 3, 1987, § 6, (Magazine) at 30,
col. 1, at 50. One commentator approximates that 85 percent of all legal malpractice suits
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This Survey will illustrate the trend toward secondary liability
of attorneys by initially focusing on several prestigious law firms
who have paid for their client's wrongs. This Survey will then ex-
plain the legal theories utilized to reach the corporate attorney.
Finally, it will suggest the reasons for and the impact of the liabil-
ity trend, and proper attorney action for avoidance of suit.
1. THOSE WHO PAY THE PRICE
Attorney as defendant is a growing phenomenon in suits alleg-
ing a violation of securities law.' This trend has a damaging effect
on attorneys and law firms, including those attorneys who profess
their innocence."0 Three very prestigious law firms, namely: Kaye,
Scholer, Fierman, Hays and Handler [Kaye Scholer]; Lord, Bissell
and Brook [Lord Bissell]; and Rogers and Wells, recently entered
settlement negotiations which clearly illustrate the trend and its
consequences."1
A. Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays and Handler
In June of 1990, Kaye Scholer agreed to a twenty million dollar
settlement with investors who were injured by the alleged fraud of
Kaye Scholer's client, Lincoln Savings and Loan.12 Lincoln Say-
are settled before trial. Id. This is true in part because lawyers do not make good witnesses
and jurors are often prejudiced against the profession. Id. See also infra notes 11-32 and
accompanying text (examples of settlements).
* See Lowenfels, supra note 1, at 412 (discussing "growing body of law that is expanding
the duties and responsibilities of attorneys under the federal securities laws"); Reycraft,
supra note 2, at 606 (noting "growing number of lawsuits being brought against lawyers
and law firms engaged in the practice of corporate and securities law"); Comment Aiding
and Abetting Liability, supra note 5, at 1191-92 ("[rlecently, the concept of Aiding and
Abetting has become increasingly important in federal securities violations"). See, e.g., Ste-
vens v. Equidyne Extractive Indus. 1980, Petro/Coal Program 1, 694 F. Supp. 1057
(S.D.N.Y.. 1988) (tax opinion letter of counsel resulting in potential securities law liability);
SEC v. Electronics Warehouse, Inc., 689 F. Supp. 53 (D. Conn. 1988) (potential securities
law liability if attorney prepares misleading documents); Excalibur Oil, Inc. v. Sullivan, 616
F. Supp. 458 (D.C. Ill. 1985) (potential securities action against attorney under Rule lOb-5
for failure to prepare title opinions).
'0 See infra notes 11-32 and accompanying text (examples of admit-no-guilt settlements
by very prestigious law firms).
"t See infra notes 12-32 (illustrating trend). See generally Marcus, Risk of Ethics Litigation
Raises Ante for Blue-Chip Law Firms, Wash. Post, May 26, 1987, Metro, at BI, Col. 2
("where once only shady sole practitioners or fly-by-night firms ended up being defendants,
today's targets of lawsuits include some of the nation's largest and most prestigious firms").
" See Law Firm in Lincoln S & L Suit Agrees to Pay $20 Million, San Francisco Chron.,
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ings and Loan filed for bankruptcy 3 after which plaintiffs pointed
the finger at professionals,"' including Kaye Scholer, who they al-
leged aided and abetted a scheme to mislead investors 8 by assist-
ing in the preparation of a misleading initial prospectus for deben-
ture bonds"6 and clearing unsafe bonds for sale.17
Kaye Scholer contended that several viable defenses would have
proven their innocence at trial.1 " Kaye Scholer attorneys charac-
June 16, 1990. Lincoln Savings and Loan issued debenture bonds and investors claimed
they were mislead to believe the bonds were federally insured. Id. at A6. See also Law Firm
Settles for $20 Million; Fraud Alleged in Keating Company Bond Sales, Bus. Ins., June 25, 1990,
at 38 [hereinafter Law Firm Settles] (reporting settlement by Kaye Scholer).
'3 See Riley, Tainted Bond? Lincoln Savings and Loan's Law Firm Accused of Helping its Cli-
ent Fleece Public, Newsday, March 11, 1990 (Business) at 64. "After fending off a federal
takeover in 1988, Lincoln collapsed like a house of cards in 1989 amid allegations of in-
sider loans, tax cheating and political fixing." Id.
14 See S & L Scandal Snares a Big Firm, Nat'l L.J., May 29, 1989 at 3. Kaye Scholer was
one of several professional firms named as defendants in the complaint alleging fraud on
the part of American Continental Corp. and its subsidiary, Lincoln Savings and Loan. Id.
Two law firms also named in the suit were Chicago-based Sidley & Austin and the Los
Angeles law firm of Parker, Milliken, Clark, O'Hara & Samuelian. See Law Firm Settles,
supra note 12, at 38. The other defendants consisted of three accounting firms including
Arthur Young & Co. and its legal successor by merger, Ernst & Young; Arthur Andersen &
Co.; and Touche Ross & Co. and its legal successor by merger, Deloitte & Touche. Id.
1" See Law Firm Settles, supra note 12, at 38. Plaintiff's allegations included that: (1) Kaye
Scholer "knowingly assisted" defendants in a scheme to make debentures appear safe and
sound; (2) the firm forged documents to cover Lincoln's improper practices; and (3) Kaye
Scholer lent "credibility" to unsound debenture bonds by permitting use of the Kaye
Scholer name in connection with the public offering. Id. See also infra notes 16-17 and
accompanying text (discussing allegations against Kaye Scholer).
16 See Law Firm in S & L Suit Agrees to Pay $20 Million, supra note 12, at A6 (discussing
Kaye Scholer's role in creation of initial prospectus); Law Firm Reportedly Agrees to $20 Mil-
lion Settlement, 267 Sacramento Bee 1228, June 4, 1990, §A, at 1. (plaintiffs labelled Kaye
Scholer "principal drafter" of false prospectuses and filings).
17 See Riley, supra note 13, at 60. Kaye Scholer was alleged to have been aware of the
risk that some bonds were "unsafe" and "unsound" and the law firm allegedly cleared
these bonds for sale to "unsuspecting investors." Id.
18 Id. at 60-62. Possible defenses included: (1) Kaye Scholer merely drafted legal docu-
ments and therefore fulfilled its role as attorney; (2) it was the accountants responsibility to
clear financial statements in the prospectuses; (3) no wrongdoing of Kaye Scholer's client
was proved in court; and (4) certain materials stated that the bonds were not insured. Id.
The primary question faced by Kaye Scholer was whether the firm engaged in solely
legal duties or went beyond their duties as counsel and assisted a fraud. Id. at 60. Kaye
Scholer denied involvement in any improper transactions. Id. Legal experts note that Kaye
Scholer had a solid defense concerning even the firm's attempt to defend the client against
federal regulators as long as Kaye Scholer "simply fought the good fight against regulators
and didn't participate in any fraudulent or improper activities that Lincoln may have been
involved in." Id.
See also Lincoln Will Pay $20 Million to Settle RICO Claims by Bondholders, 55 Banking Rep.
(BNA) No. 3, at 114 (firm denies wrongdoing or responsibility for losses); Law Firm in S &
L Suit Agrees to Pay $20 Million, supra note 12, at A6 (same).
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terized the suit as "frivolous" and "ridiculous". 19 Nonetheless,
Kaye Scholer agreed to a settlement after considering the cost of
trial, and the fact that settlement was fully covered by insurers.20
B. Lord, Bissell and Brook
In October of 1989, Lord Bissell agreed to a twenty-four mil-
lion dollar settlement to clear the law firm of charges of racke-
teering and aiding and abetting the alleged fraud of National
Mortgage Equity Corporation [NMEC]. 21 Lord Bissell, a partner
of which held a significant financial interest in this client corpora-
tion,22 allegedly ignored evidence of NMEC's fraudulent activi-
ties,2" including the client's alleged use of fictitious appraisers,
buyers and lenders and the alleged retention of a near-bankrupt
insurer to guarantee loans.24 Lord Bissell denied any wrongdo-
ing. 5 Nonetheless, the firm negotiated a settlement in order to
" See S & L Scandal Snares a Big Firm, supra note 14, at 3. An American Continental
Corp. spokesman explained that the suit in state court against the law firms "is so ridicu-
lous that they are afraid to bring it in federal court because of Rule 11 [sanctions]." Id.
o See Law Firm Settles, supra note 12, at 38. "Kaye Scholer admits no wrongdoing and
says that defending the suit caused 'a substantial drain' on resources." Id. (quoting letter
from firm to its employees). Kaye Scholer also decided to settle recognizing the sympa-
thetic position of the plaintiffs. Id. The law firm also considered the unfriendly California
forum where most bonds were issued. See Lincoln Firm Will Pay $20 Million to Settle RICO
Claims by Bondholders, 55 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 3, at 114.
", See O'Brien, Some Firms Never Learn, Am. Lawyer, Oct. 1989, at 63. Lord Bissell set-
tled after they were accused of involvement in their client's dubious scheme. Id. Lord Bis-
sell's client, NMEC, was engaged in the practice of obtaining residential mortgages, putting
them in pools and issuing mortgage backed certificates which they claimed were supported
by a triple layer of protection. See It's Not Over for Lord Bissell, Chicago Trib., Feb. 16,
1988, (Business) at 3 (Sports Final ed.). The NMEC certificates were very attractive in that:
(1) they offered yields up to 18 percent; (2) they were backed by property; (3) NMEC and
the brokers certified the borrower's ability tQ pay and the property backing the loans; and
(4) insurers wrote bonds on each mortgage. O'Brien, supra at 64. Before the close of 1984,
however, the pools had either collapsed or were stocked with defaulted loans. Id. NMEC
was alleged to have carried out a "Massive Ponzi-Scheme." Id.
"' See O'Brien, supra note 21, at 64. Leslie Michael, a partner at Lord Bissell was a
founder and a major shareholder in the client corporation, NMEC. d.
13 See O'Brien, supra note 21, at 64-65 (discussing NMEC's alleged activities and warning
that Lord Bissell partners received and ignored).
" See It's Not Over For Lord Bissell, supra note 21, at 3. The claim also alleged that the
law firm failed to act to protect investors and allegedly wrote letters supporting NMEC. See
O'Brien, supra note 21, at 35.
" See It's Not Over For Lord Bissell, supra note 21, at 3. A Lord Bissell partner, Joseph
Coughlin, stated that the firm had not engaged in any type of fraud. Id.
408
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avoid a "messy trial" and negative publicity.2"
C. Rogers and Wells
In April of 1986, Rogers and Wells entered into an admit-no-
guilt settlement 7 when it agreed to pay forty million dollars2 8 in
response to charges which stemmed from the fraud of their client,
"San Diego swindler J. David Dominelli,"2 9 who sold unregistered
securities to numerous disappointed investors.30 The suit against
Rogers and Wells alleged that the firm aided and abetted the
fraud by continuing to represent and assist Dominelli after its at-
torneys should have known of the fraud." Rogers and Wells en-
tered negotiations which resulted in the painful settlement to
avoid defense costs and the cost of negative publicity.3
II. LAWYER AS AIDER AND ABETTOR
A typical legal theory used in actions attempting to hold corpo-
rate attorneys secondarily liable for their clients' actions is lawyer
as aider and abettor of the wrong. 3 Plaintiffs often allege that
securities attorneys are secondarily liable as aiders and abettors of
securities violations under Section 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 19341" and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder.3 5
' See O'Brien, supra note 21, at 64-67 (discussing Lord Bissell's settlement).
' See Tabac, supra note 8, at 47 (discussing Rogers and Well's settlement).
38 See Galante, After $40 Million Payment, It's Not Over Yet for Rogers & Wells, Nat'l L.J.,
Apr. 14, 1986, at 1, col. 1. This was called the "largest malpractice settlement ever re-
ported." Reycraft, supra note 2, at 605.
" See DeBenedictis, supra note 2, at 34 (labeling Dominelli a "San Diego swindler").
o See Lincoln Faces Formidable Foe, 267 Sacramento Bee 43397, Feb. 25, 1990, § H at 1.
Investors lost more than $80 million. Id. at 1. Other professional firms sued in connection
with the Dominelli fraud include the law firm of Wiles, Circuit & Tremblay and the
Laventhol & Horwath Accounting Company. See Bilked Investors Win Suit Against Law Firm,
Attorney, L.A. Times, Aug. 28, 1987, part 4, at 1, col. 1.
"' See Tabac supra note 8, at 47 (discussing alleged wrongful conduct of Rogers & Wells);
Galante, supra note 28, at 1 (same).
" See Galante, supra note 28, at 36-37 (discussing settlement); Galante, Last 'J. David'
Firm Agrees to Pact: Rogers & Wells Still Under Fire, Nat'l L.J. April 13, 1987, at 3 (discussing
additional battles faced by Rogers & Wells and advantages of settlement alternative).
"' See supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing aiding and abetting as predomi-
nant legal theory).
" Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78(j)(b)(1982). This section
makes it unlawful "[to use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any secur-
ity ... any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
409
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This Rule makes it unlawful for anyone to defraud or deceive an-
other in connection with the sale or purchase of a security." To
prove aiding and abetting liability under SEC Rule 1Ob-5, the
plaintiff must show: (1) a primary violation of Section 10(b) by a
main actor; (2) knowledge of the primary violation; and (3) sub-
stantial assistance.3 7
Aiding and abetting liability, as applied to attorneys, is exempli-
fied in First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Pittsburgh v. Op-
penheim, Appel, Dixon & Co. [First Federal Savings and Loan].3" In
First Federal Savings and Loan, the Southern District Court of New
York held that an attorney could be liable as aider and abettor of
his client's fraud for advising the client to continue its behavior
and for counseling the client's accountant not to act against the
fraud. 9
The client securities dealer was found guilty of fraud in an ear-
lier litigation." ° The client later brought suit against his own ac-
countant for aiding and abetting in the securities law violation.' 1
The accountant, in turn, impleaded the defendant law firm for
interest or for the protection of investors." Id.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1988). Rule lOb-5 states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by-the use of any means or
instrumentality ... of any facility of any national securities exchange, (a) To employ
any device, scheme or artifice to defraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of a
material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the state-
ments made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which oper-
ates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with
purchase or sale of any security.
Id.
" Id. See also LHLC Corp. v. Cluett, Peabody & Co., Inc., 842 F.2d 928, 932-33 (7th
Cir.) (discussing aiding and abetting liability under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5), cert. de-
nied, 488 U.S. 926, (1988); Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490,
494-96 (7th Cir. 1986) (same).
"' See SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1315-1318 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
908 (1975) (stated most frequently used version of three part aider-abettor liability test);
IIT, An Int'l Inv. Trust v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 922 (2d Cir. 1980) (discussing elements
for aiding and abetting liability); Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84, 93-97 (5th Cir.
1975) (same). See also supra note 6 and accompanying text (discussing elements of aiding
and abetting liability). See generally Comment, Aiding and Abetting Liability, supra note 5, at
1198-99.
" 634 F. Supp. 1341 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
"' First Fed. Say. and Loan, 634 F. Supp. at 1351-53.
40 Wichita Fed. Say. & Loan Assoc. v. Comark, 586 F. Supp. 940 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), rear-
gued, 610 F. Supp. 406 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff d, 810 F.2d 1161 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
41 See First Fed. Say. & Loan, 634 F. Supp. at 1343.
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contribution based on the identical legal theory.' 2
The accountant alleged that the defendant law firm aided and
abetted in the securities violation by providing legal advice which
encouraged the securities dealer to continue its fraudulent behav-
ior."3 The accountant argued that the law firm's advice to the ac-
countant to maintain his position without disclosing the client's
fraud and without fear of liability were acts of an aider and abet-
tor.'" The court, after reviewing the elements which constitute
aiding and abetting liability, held that the allegations were suffi-
cient to state a claim.'0
The court in First Federal Savings and Loan is among several
lower courts that have expressed a willingness to hold attorneys
secondarily liable under the aiding and abetting liability theory.4'
The United States Supreme Court has labelled aiding and abet-
ting liability an open question as applied to securities fraud and
misrepresentation . 47 Nonetheless, lower courts have increasingly
utilized this legal theory to find corporate attorneys secondarily
liable and have given the theory considerable legitimacy. 48
42 Id.
43 Id. at 1344.
4, See First Fed. Say. & Loan Assoc. of Pittsburgh v. Oppenheim, Appel, Dixon & Co.,
634 F. Supp. 1341, 1344 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). See generally Reycraft, supra note 2, at 606.
"[Sluits against lawyers are more frequently being brought by persons who were not them-
selves clients of the lawyers, but who nonetheless claim that the lawyers have breached a
duty owed to them." Id.
" See First Fed. Sav. & Loan, 634 F. Supp. at 1351-53.
46. See, e.g., Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 44 (2d Cir. 1977) (attorney
liable as aider and abettor), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978); Kilmartin v. H.C. Wain-
wright & Co., 580 F. Supp. 604, 608 (D. Mass. 1984) (denying attorney's motion to dismiss
claims for aiding and abetting fraud). Cf lIT, An Int'l Inv. Trust v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d
909, 922 (2d Cir. 1980) (alleging accountant and underwriter liable for aiding and
abetting).
' See Herman & Maclean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 379 n.5 (1983). "While several
Courts of Appeals have permitted aider-and-abettor liability . . . we specifically reserved
this issue .... " Id. (citing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 191-92 n.7 (1976)).
See also Comment, Aiding and Abetting Liability, supra note 5, at 1192.
The Supreme Court of the United States has never validated the use of aiding and
abetting as a proper theory of liability under Rule 10b-5; thus, there may be doubt
as to its continued viability. However, the lower courts appear to have established
the legitimacy of aiding and abetting.
Id.
" See supra note 46 and accompanying text (citing cases which utilized aiding and abet-
ting legal theory).
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III. ATTORNEY LIABILITY TREND ANALYSIS
A. Reasons for and Development of the Trend
The increase in cases involving attorneys named as defendants
is a result of an expansion of attorney involvement in corporate
decisionmaking and business competition among law firms.49
Plaintiffs, recognizing the deep pockets of corporate attorneys,50
take advantage of a modern corporate lawyer's potential involve-
ment in a client's action51 and the law firm's compromise of pro-
fessionalism in its desire to maximize business.5 2
Considering today's fast paced corporate world with its demand-
ing deadlines, attorneys often find themselves at the fulcrum of
corporate decisionmaking.53 As a result, attorneys are perceived
as the conscience of complex corporate client6 and as frequent
participants in a client's wrong.54 Unfortunately, attorneys find in-
adequate guidance from the Model Code of Professional Respon-
"9 See Marcus, supra note 11, at BI. Legal ethics experts "cite changing attitudes toward
lawyers, the difficulty of monitoring conflicts of interest and maintaining high ethical stan-
dards in the modern-day mega-firm of several hundred lawyers, and the increasingly fever-
ish competition for business among firms" as leading to an explosion of litigation. Id. See
also Reycraft, supra note 2, at 607 (discussing reasons for trend).
" See Comment, Aiding and Abetting Liability, supra note 5, at 1191 n. 12. "A deep pocket
defendant is a party commonly referred to in many areas of the law as a defendant who has
a vast reserve of readily available cash which could be used to satisfy a judgment." Id. See
also infra notes 67-68 and accompanying text (discussing lawyer as "deep pocket" defend-
ant because of liability insurance).
81 See infra notes 53-58 and accompanying text (discussing expanding attorney roles).
81 See infra notes 59-65 and accompanying text (discussing increasing competition among
law firms).
" See ABA Committee Discusses Kern Ruling, Internationalization, SEC Amicus Briefs, 20 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 46, at 1786 (Nov. 25, 1988) [hereinafter Kern Ruling]. This
report discussed In re Allied Stores Corp., ["1987 decisions"] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
84,142 (June 29, 1987), a case in which the SEC alleged that attorney/director Kern made
a decision not to amend the Schedule 14D-9 and disclose information regarding takeover
negotiations as required by law. Id. The report revealed an argument made by Dennis
Block, Weil Gotshal & Manges: "the fast breaking developments in takeover fights often
makes it impossible, for all practical purposes, for counsel not to assume the same role
Kern held." See Kern Ruling, 20 Sec. Reg. L. Rep. (BNA) at 1787. See also Marcus, supra
note 11, at B 1 ("in many complex financial situations, lawyers are prominent players").
See generally Burke, The Duty of Confidentiality and Disclosing Corporate Misconduct, 36
Bus. LAW. 239, 253-60 (1981). Society expects attorneys to simultaneously promote social
mores and protect corporate clients. Id. "[Big ticket litigation" against attorneys alleged to
be participants in a corporation's wrong "will keep pace with the expansion of attorney's
roles." Jensen, supra note 2, at 1 (quoting Richard Greenfield, a leading shareholder's
rights attorney).
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sibility" and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct" in deter-
mining their proper role as a corporate lawyer.57 Thus, unguided
corporate attorneys often end up as defendants based on actions
which may exceed the role of counsel.58
A rise in competition among law firms has contributed to this
increase in liability. 9 Competition has led to an increase in attor-
ney advertising, 60 the desire for favorable publicity6 and a com-
promise of professionalism." In response, plaintiffs have sought to
hold attorneys liable not merely as professionals, but as business-
men. 8 The argument is that law firms should not reap the bene-
" MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1980).
MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983).
'7 See Reycraft, supra note 2, at 608. "The Model Code fails to provide detailed guide-
lines for lawyers engaging in the practice of corporate or securities law, How such lawyers
should perceive their role and responsibilities in providing corporate counseling is a ques-
tion on which the Model Code is remarkably silent." Id. See also HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE
PRACTICE OF LAW 9 (1978) (criticizing code's simplistic treatment of complex issues); Burke,
supra note 54, at 279 ("very few provisions of the code directly address the problems of
lawyers representing corporate clients").
" See supra notes 12-32 and accompanying text (discussing attorney as defendant).
" See Reycraft, supra note 2, at 606-07. Firms are pressured to compete for the business
of large corporate clients which adds to the increased number of lawsuits filed against law-
yers. Id. See also Gillers, Ethics that Bite: Lawyers' Liability to Third Parties, 13 LITIGATION J. 8,
12, 63 (Winter 1987) (discussing change in liability standards for attorneys because of com-
petition); infra .notes 60-64 and accompanying text (discussing increased lawyer liability as
result of competition).
" See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 377-78 (1977). Advertising has become a
powerful tool used to penetrate the legal market ever since constitutional protection was
afforded to attorney advertising in 1977. Id. at 381. See generally Gillers, supra note 59, at
12, 63 (discussing ramifications of Bates).
" See Gray, More Lawyers Reluctantly Adopt Strange New Practice-Marketing, Wall St. J., Jan.
30, 1987, at 25, col. 3. Law firms are known to hire public relations experts to highlight
victories and downplay defeats. Id.
" See Symposium: Legal Ethics in the Age of Marketing, Legal Times of Washington, July
22, 1985, at 32. Attorneys view themselves as a business to the extent that "you do have to
have more numbers on the credit side than the debit side to keep practicing the profes-
sion." Id. See also Reycraft, supra note 2, at 606-08 (listing various factors involved in dete-
rioration of profession's image); Garth, Rethinking the Legal Professions' Approach to Collective
Self-Improvement: Competence and the Consumer Perspective, 1983 Wis. L. REv. 639, 657 (1983)
(traditional outlook on legal profession adversely affected by "price competition and
advertising").
" See Reycraft, supra note 2, at 607. Viewing law firms as businesses takes away "aura of
protection and trust" they previously enjoyed. Id. See also Gillers, supra note 59, at 12. "A
profession may be able to make a claim for favored status where a business cannot. In-
creased willingness to hold law firms to liability standards like those that encumber busi-
nesses is partly the result of an altered conception of law practice as being in fact a busi-
ness." Id.; Schneyor, Professionalism and Public Policy: The Case of House Counsel, 2 GRo. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 449, 449-50 (1988). Sociologists label this phenomenon "deprofessionaliza-
tion." Id. See generally Rothman, Deprofessionalization: The Case of Law in America, 183
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fits of advertising and running a competitive business without
compromising the limited liability typically granted only to
professionals."
An increase in business competition has driven some attorneys
to compromise their positions and ethical responsibilities in an at-
tempt to appease corporate clients who provide the bulk of their
revenues.66 It is submitted that such compromised behavior opens
another door to a plaintiff in suit against an attorney.
Plaintiffs have found potential gaps in attorney ethics which
they are utilizing to position the attorney as a defendant.60 Attor-
neys are attractive defendants since large law firms usually carry
sizeable liability insurance policies.67 Adversaries recognize the
"deep pockets" of their attorney opponent particularly when the
corporate defendant is bankrupt.68
(1974) (discussing the effects of deprofessionalization on legal profession).
" See Gillers, supra note 59, at 63. "You cannot easily be a business for purposes of the
First Amendment and a profession for purposes of liability." Id. See also supra note 63 and
accompanying text (discussing business versus profession). But see Levine, Self-Interest or
Self-Defense: Lawyer Disregard of the Attorney-Client Privilege for Profit and Protection, 5 HOF-
STRA L. REV. 783, 829 (1977) (untrusting view of legal profession should permit attorney to
defend livelihood and competence without "be[ing] perceived as self-serving").
6 See generally Marcus, supra note 14. "Experts... cite economic pressures on firms that
may lead lawyers to knowingly violate ethics rules, issue risky opinions or shade their judg-
ment in their economic favor." Id. at BI.
See also Reycraft, supra note 2, at 606-07. An increased number of law firms are special-
izing to meet the needs of large corporate clients. Id. As a result, a rise in litigation involv-
ing law firms as defendants has occurred. Id. at 607. This is essentially due to adverse
interests arising between present and former clients as well as from claims of attorney mal-
practice. Id.
See supra notes 12-32 and accompanying text (illustrating attorney as defendant).
* See Marcus, supra note 11, at B 1 (plaintiffs are becoming aware of lawyer's large insur-
ance policies); Jensen, supra note 2, at 1 (same); DeBenedictis, supra note 2, at 34 (law
firms' liability insurance makes them attractive defendants); Reycraft, supra note 2, at 607
(same). See also Gray, Under Fire: Regulators, the Courts and Clients Bear Down on Lawyers,
Wall St. J., Aug. 21, 1987, at 17, Col. 3 (same). See, eg., Cronin v. Midwestern Oklahoma
Dev. Auth., 619 F.2d 856 (10th Cir. 1980) (insured lawyer named as defendant).
" See Jensen, supra note 2, at 1. "If a client enterprise fails, the disappointed investors,
lenders, and all other third parties who have suffered financial loss immediately look for
compensation to the deep-pocket professional advisors." Id. (quoting Robert O'Malley). See
also DeBenedictis, supra note 2, at 34 (recognizing "deep-pocket" theory as motivation to
initiate claims against lawyers); Gillers, supra note 59, at 9 (explaining factors which make
attorneys and firms attractive defendants, including notion that sizeable insurance carried
by firms furthers "deep-pocket" rationale); Reycraft, supra note 2, at 606-08 (same); supra
note 50 and accompanying text (same).
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B. Impact of the Trend
Attorneys who find their clients engaged in improper activities
are at a severe disadvantage." Withdrawal or disclosure of such
activities may lead to substantial loss of income for the firm, or
loss of employment for corporate counsel; however, inaction leads
to possible liability and damage to attorney reputation. 0
It is submitted that increased corporate lawyer liability poses a
threat not only to the attorney, but to the client as well. Attorneys
may become overly cautious in giving advice, particularly concern-
ing business decisions, for fear that their actions will exceed that
which is permitted as counsel.7'
It is further submitted that such liability poses a threat to the
relationship of attorney and client and the attorney-client privi-
lege. The attorney-client privilege and confidential relationship is
diminished when a lawyer, fearing involvement with unethical ac-
tivities and liability, discloses a fraud or withdraws from a repre-
sentation since mere withdrawal leads to curiosity. 2
*9 See infra note 70 and accompanying text (discussing impact of liability trend on
lawyers).
7 See Burke, supra note 54, at 264-65. Lawyers are faced with a difficult dilemma when
deciding whether to disclose a client's "arguably illegal scheme." Id. at 264. Outside coun-
sel confronts the possibility of losing important revenue producing clients. Id. On the other
hand, inside counsel must be wary of breaching the client's confidentiality which would
lead to an attorney's "loss of livelihood." Id. See also Marcus, supra note 11, at B1.
"[D]efending itself against litigation can be a harrowing experience for a firm, which
trades on its reputation. Partner may be set against partner, lawyers may defect to other
firms, clients may drop the firm or potential clients may stay away." Id.
71 See Marcus, supra note 11, at BI. If lawyers are exposed to too much liability, they
may become self-protective and begin to put their own interests ahead of their clients. Id.
See also Gillers, supra note 59, at 63-64 (lawyers must be given freedom necessary to fully
advise clients without fear of liability).
" See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 398 (1981). If the attorney-client privi-
lege is not protected "[i]nefficiency, unfairness and sharp practices would inevitably de-
velop in the giving of legal advice and in the preparation of cases for trial." Id. See also In
re Carter &Johnson, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) § 82, 147, at 84,172
(Feb. 28, 1981) (lawyer's fear of own liability may result in disclosure and interfere with
client's wishes which is not in public interest). See also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RE-
sPoNsIBILrrY, EC 4-1 (1969). "Both the fiduciary relationship existing between lawyer and
client and the proper functioning of the legal system require the preservation by the law-
yer of confidences and secrets of one who has employed or sought to employ him." Id.
Disciplinary Rule 4-101(C)(3) states that an attorney may reveal his client's intention to
commit a crime. Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional Responsibility, 90 HARV. L. REV.
702, 739 (1977). This exception to the attorney-client privilege is the only one which
"serves the public's interest without also serving the attorney's [interest]." Id. See generally
Burke, supra note 54, at 264. "Revealing confidential information is a treachery, a betrayal
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In contrast, it is suggested, that the attorney liability trend may
be a necessary phenomenon despite its harsh results. It is submit-
ted that the attorney-client relationship and privilege is under-
mined when the client uses it as a shield behind which he can per-
petrate fraud without fear of public discovery from attorney
disclosure. The protection provided by the attorney-client privi-
lege was never intended to protect a fraudfeasor and, as such,
should not be utilized by a client to perpetrate a fraud.7 3
C. Proper Action for Avoidance of Liability
Experts in the field of advising attorneys on how to avoid mal-
practice suits and unnecessary participation in a corporate client's
fraud, stress that attorneys should not be overly trusting of a cli-
ent and that they should make inquiries into the client's actions. 4
Law firms should adopt policies which prohibit attorneys from sit-
ting on the board of directors and from maintaining a financial
interest in their corporate clients since these are the attorneys
most frequently in trouble.76 Law firms should adopt a strategy
of trust, and a breach of fiduciary duty of loyalty, besmirching the attorney's honor and
trustworthiness." Id. But See Frank, A Higher Duty: A New Look at the Ethics of the Corporate
Lawyer, 26 CuEv. ST. L. REV. 337, 353-364 (1977) (attorney-client privilege must be weighed
against interests of third parties affected by fraudulent acts).
"' See Burke, supra note 54, at 264. A client who has used his attorney-client relationship
for wrongful purposes is the primary actor in betrayal of the relationship and "should not
benefit from the protection of his confidences." Id. See also Note, Client Fraud and the Law-
yer-An Ethical Analysis, 62 MINN. L. REV. 89, 90-91 n.9 (1977) (fraudulent client not deserv-
ing of attorney-client privilege because it would be abusive of attorney's skills).
"It is ... clear . . . that a lawyer is not privileged to unthinkingly permit himself to be
coopted into an ongoing fraud and cast a dupe or a shield for a wrong doing client." In re
Carter & Johnson [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) § 82, 147 at 1 84,172
(Feb. 28, 1981).
"' See Takeover, Insider Trading Themes Pervade Annual Garrett Conference, 19 Sec. Reg. &
L. Rep. (BNA) at 687 (May 8, 1987). Robert O'Malley, Loss-Prevention Counsel for the
Attorney Liability Assurance Society, advised not to assume that clients will not engage in
criminal misconduct - referring to "world class felons" such as J. David Dominelli and Ivan
Boesky. Id. He reminded attorneys to keep their eyes open since the most significant prob-
lem arises when a client commits a violation and uses the attorney as an "instrument" to do
so. Id. Attorney liability, he feels, is most prevalent in the securities and real estate areas.
Tabac, supra note 8, at 50, col. 2.
" See O'Brien, supra note 21, at 67. Prestigious law firms, tearing liability, have increas-
ingly adopted written guidelines for their attorneys regarding equity ownership in a corpo-
rate client. Id. The Attorney Liability Assurance Society (ALAS) adheres to a policy which
bars partners from sitting on the board or being officers of corporate clients. Id. The
ALAS does not bar equity participation, but does discourage it. Id. One New York-based
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which will continually keep their attorneys, including the part-
ners, in check."6
It is suggested that the above preventive strategies should be
cautiously heeded in order to avoid the difficult and inadequately
guided position of an attorney who discovers a client's fraudulent
activity. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct issued, and the
SEC acknowledged," very general guidelines directing attorney
action when a client's improper conduct is discovered.7 8 The
Model Rules state that an attorney, upon discovering a client's
wrongful action, should first advise the corporation to correct the
action and to take reasonable steps to dissuade his client from con-
tinuation of these actions.7 9 If unsuccessful, the attorney may re-
professional liability lawyer noted: "It's the young, aggressive, fast-rising star that causes,
disproportionately, up to ninety percent of these problems. It's the fast-rising cowboy." Id.
" See Takeover, Insider Trading Themes Pervade Annual Garrett Conference, supra note 74,
at 686. O'Malley noted that very close review is needed on a partner-to-partner basis. Id.
He discussed a partner peer review that would be similar to the common practice of over-
seeing the work of associates. Id.
77 See In re Carter & Johnson [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) § 82,147
at 84,170 (Feb. 28, 1981). Although the SEC has not adopted the Model Rules, they are
considered "generally recognized norms of professional conduct." Id.
71 See MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13(b)(c) (1983). These guidelines,
although somewhat inefficient, offer the clearest existing official direction to the corporate
attorney who discovers a faulty action by his client. See Rotunda, The Notice of Withdrawal
and the New Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Blowing the Whistle and Waving the Red Flag,
63 OR. L. REV. 455, 455-56 (1984) [hereinafter Rotunda, Notice of Withdrawal]. The Model
Code of Professional Responsibility is confusing as to what the attorney's ethical responsi-
bility entails. Id. The Model Code speaks only to lawyers in a litigation context. See Rey-
craft, supra note 2, at 607-08.
79 MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RULE 1.13(b)(c). The rule states in pertinent
part that:
(b) if a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer . . . [or] employee is en-
gaged in action, intends to act or refuses to act in a matter related to the representa-
tion that is a violation of a legal obligation to the organization, or a violation of law.
• . the lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the
organization .... Such measures may include among others:
(1) asking reconsideration of the matter; (2) advising that a separate legal opinion
... be sought; and (3) referring the matter to higher authority in the
organization ....
(c) if, despite the lawyer's efforts in accordance with paragraph (b), the highest
authority that can act on behalf of the organization insists upon action, or a refusal
to act, . . . the lawyer may resign in accordance with Rule 1.16.
Id. See In re Carter &Johnson, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) § 82,147 at
84,145 (Feb. 28, 1981) (SEC's version of proper action). See also Reycraft, supra note 2, at
612 (discussing sample actions to dissuade corporate wrong). See generally Smith, Disclosure
Problems of Companies and the Responsibilities of Counsel, 1 S_. REG. L.J. 34 (1973) (overview
of contemporary cases regarding disclosure problems faced by attorneys).
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sign. 80 Disclosure is prohibited where the information concerning
a previously committed fraud is protected by the attorney-client
privilege. 8'
It is suggested that a more complete set of official guidelines are
necessary because expert-advised preventive strategies are mere
suggestions. Furthermore, the Model Rules are vague, and leave
too much to the judgment of a potentially liable attorney who dis-
covers a client's wrong.
CONCLUSION
The trend of lawyer liability for wrongs of corporate clients is a
very real phenomenon. Lawyers are increasingly labelled "aiders
and abettors" of various corporate wrongs. Although unguided in
their responsibilities, lawyers are increasingly liable for the illegal
activities of their clients. Today's corporate lawyer carries the in-
surance, the business image and often the power within the corpo-
" See MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13(c) supra note 79.
Upon resignation, the attorney should give notice of withdrawal and so alert the world
of a not so innocent operation. See Rotunda, Client Fraud: Blowing the Whistle, Other Options,
24 TRIAL 92, 96-97 (Nov. 1988) [hereinafter Rotunda, Client Fraud] (discussing need to
avoid liability by disclosing); Rotunda, The Notice of Withdrawal supra note 78, at 478-80
(discussing proper attorney action upon notice of withdrawal).
Comment 1.6 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides: "Neither this rule
nor Rule 1.8(b) nor Rule 1.16(d) prevents the lawyer from giving notice of the fact of
withdrawal, and the lawyer may also withdraw or disaffirm any opinion, document, affirma-
tion, or the like." MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 comment (1984)
(withdrawal).
One commentator construed Rule 1.6 as enabling "the lawyer [to] give a sufficient signal
that the transaction is smelly, so long as he does not reveal the information upon which he
reached the conclusion that he should give such a signal." Hazard, Rectification of Client
Fraud: Death and Revival of a Professional Norm, 33 EMORY L.J. 271, 303 (1984).
"1 See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILrr DR 4-101 (1969). This rule main-
tains that an attorney may not reveal information obtained in a privileged relationship with
the client. Id. Although this privilege is highly guarded it is subject to exceptions such as
disclosure permitted for intent to commit a crime as listed in Disciplinary Rule 4-101(C).
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrty DR 4-101(C) (1969). See also MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 4 (1980) (attorney must preserve confidences of
client).
In 1981, the Securities Exchange Commission backed away from a mandatory duty of
disclosure. In re Carter & Johnson, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) §
82,147 at 1 84,169 (Feb. 28, 1981)" See generally Rotunda, Client Fraud, supra note 80, at
92-97 (discussing proper action to be taken by attorney upon discovery of client fraud);
Hazard, supra note 80, at 296-306 (discussing development and acceptance of ABA guide-
lines for proper action); Rotunda, Notice of Withdrawal, supra note 78, at 471-84 (discussion
of Model Rules).
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ration to be targeted as a defendant. This trend has a threatening,
but somewhat necessary, effect on the attorney and client as indi-
viduals, as well as on the attorney-client privilege and relationship.
Colleen Graham
RULE 11 SANCTIONS: THE SUPREME COURT GIVES RULE 11 A
STRONGER BITE AND A LONGER LEASH
In its original form, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure established that an attorney's signature on a pleading consti-
tuted a certification that to the best of the attorney's " knowledge,
information and belief there is good ground to support it, and
that it is not interposed for delay." 1 The rule was promulgated to
I FED. R. Civ. P. 11, 28 U.S.C.A. R. 11 (1938). The following text illustrates the additions
and deletions of the 1983 amendment (italics show additions, brackets deletions):
Rule 11. Signing of Pleadings, Motions, and Other Papers; Sanctions Every pleading,
motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at
least one attorney of record in his individual name, whose address shall be stated. A
party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign his pleading, motion, or other
paper and state his address. Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or
statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. The rule in eq-
uity that the averments of an answer under oath must be overcome by the testimony
of two witnesses or of one witness sustained by corroborating circumstances is abol-
ished. The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that he
has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, infor-
mation and belief [there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed
for delay] formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by
existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing
law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion, or
other paper is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission
is called to the attention of the pleader or movant. [or is signed with intent to defeat the
purpose of this rule; it may be stricken as sham and false and the action may proceed
as though the pleading had not been served. For a wilful violation of this rule an
attorney may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary action. Similar action may be
taken if scandalous or indecent matter is inserted.] Ifa pleading, motion, or other paper
is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall
impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction,
which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable
expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a
reasonable attorney's fee.
Proposed Amendment FED. R. Civ. P. 11, quoted at 97 F.R.D. 196-97 (1983).
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